In fiscal 2019, Canadian arms exports were slightly in excess of CAD 3.75 billion. This is a record. Most of these exports (circa CAD 3 billion) went to non-NATO countries. For our purposes, “arms” include civilian goods and technology deemed to have military applications.
According to Global Affairs Canada, exports of arms to non-NATO countries are expected to grow.
This will pose a challenge to Canada. Arms exports are regulated in Canada primarily through the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA). In a nutshell, the export of arms requires a ministerial permit issued by Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (EIPA, section 7).
On September 17, 2019, Canada ratified the multilateral United Nations’ 2014 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
To comply with the ATT, the EIPA was amended to (i) regulate not only the export of arms but also certain arms brokerage activities, and (ii) broaden the criteria that the Minister must take into account prior to authorizing an export.
In addition to conforming to certain longstanding standards, such as national security and compliance with Canada’s treaty obligations, the EIPA now requires the Minister to do two things:
- First, take into consideration whether the export would contribute to peace and security or undermine it, and whether the export could be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian or human rights law, an act of terror, or acts of gender-based violence or violence against women and children (EIPA, section 7.3);
- Second, determine whether there is a substantial risk that any of the above could occur (EIPA, section 7.4).
While one can only applaud the Federal government for causing Canada to ratify the ATT, it remains that the decision to issue an arms export permit in Canada ultimately resides with an elected official, i.e., Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that he or she may be placed in a very difficult position in the event that refusing to issue an export permit—or suspending an issued permit—would have adverse economic consequences in Canada.
To better insulate the Minister from undue pressure, it would be preferable if the evaluation of the consequences of an export were made by an independent third party, such as the Auditor General of Canada. In such a case, the Minister would retain the final say, but the grounds for the decision would be provided by a neutral party. Any perceived lack of “expertise” in international affairs might actually be an advantage as the third party might be more willing to expand its information sources and less interested in reaffirming prior biases and analyses.