1. On September 21, 2022, Russia’s President Putin addressed his nation on television and announced a partial mobilization of at least 300,000 reservists. This was done to appease Russian nationalists, reinforce the line of contact with Ukrainian forces, strengthen Russia’s position in future negotiations, and provide a stronger springboard for a Spring offensive. The effect of the partial mobilization will not be felt for some time and Ukraine will probably redouble efforts to regain territory before winter sets in.
  2. Putin also confirmed that the process of Russian annexation of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts would begin in earnest. Annexation presents the world with a fait accompli and serves as a legal veneer for Russia to (i) threaten the use of arms of mass destruction should Ukraine continue military operations or (ii) invade those areas of the four Oblasts now held by Ukraine. The need to provide legal cover, however thin, to any action was part of the Soviet playbook and it is interesting that this habit has survived the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolution of the USSR. Unsurprisingly, Ukraine and its allies have condemned the annexations and stated that they will not recognize them.
  3. On September 22, 2022, Ukraine’s President Zelensky addressed the United Nations General Assembly. In his speech, given in English, President Zelensky outlined five “non-negotiable” principles for peace. Needless to say, most if not all the principles are unacceptable to Russia. The G7 and its allies, while promising to continue to support Ukraine militarily and economically, have not provided detailed comments on the principles. 

The G7 and its allies, while sympathetic to Ukraine and its demands, are weary of the war and want a cease-fire followed by negotiations, likely to be protracted. They are not alone. China and India are also openly asking for an end to hostilities, followed by negotiations. While the G7 and its allies are conscious of the dangers of setting a bad precedent, they believe that the best course of action in dealing with Russia is to:

a. Secure the roughly 80% of territory that Kyiv currently controls, including the all-important Odessa coastline. It is significant to remember that at the beginning of the war, many commentators predicted the whole of Ukraine would fall within a few weeks, if not days. Ukraine has performed far above even the most optimistic expectations. 

b. Help Ukraine reconstruct its infrastructure and economy, with an agreement for eventual entry into the European Union.

c. Strengthen the Ukrainian military, including by providing it with the means to protect its skies and sea approaches. The debate, of course, will continue as to the type of offensive weapons to be provided or have manufactured in Ukraine, but as the conflict progresses there appears to be a consensus that Ukraine needs heavy weapons, including a capable air force and main battle tanks.

In other words, the G7 and its allies are prepared to outspend Russia in Ukraine whilst at the same time constraining Russia’s economy through sanctions. 

Outspending and wide-ranging export controls (a.k.a. sanctions) defeated the USSR and, with patience, this strategy should be successful against Putin’s Russia.

The difficult part will be to convince Ukraine to accept a 1/5th reduction of its territory after all its hardships and sacrifices.