In the last few days, (i) Russia forswore the first use of tactical nuclear weapons, except in the case of an existential threat — and in the same breath acknowledged that Ukraine does not pose an existential threat, (ii) a Russian colonel-general (a four-star general in US parlance) proclaimed that the first phase of the war was over, and that it was time to concentrate on the “liberation of Donbass,” thereby effectively shortening the list of Russian demands, (iii) Russia announced that it would be unilaterally reducing “military activity” around Ukraine’s capital as a prelude to the face-to-face negotiations in Turkey on the 29th of March, and (iv) some Russian units have disengaged on the Northern front and temporarily returned to Russia or Belarus.
Why the very public change in Russia’s posture?
To paraphrase Japan’s Emperor Hirohito’s surrender speech on August 15, 1945, the war situation in Ukraine has developed in a manner not necessarily to Russia’s advantage. For the officer corp, the main scapegoat for this state of affairs is — rightly or wrongly — the Kremlin and the “hard men” surrounding President Putin. It has not escaped the Kremlin’s notice that a disgruntled officer corp leading men unwilling to be canon-fodder (many of whom are not ethnic Russians) is a force that can quickly cover the 450 km or so that separates Ukraine from Moscow. Morale and discipline go hand-in-hand: the reported incident by Western officials of a Russian tank running over a brigade commander because his unit had greatly suffered is a powerful indicia that the Russian army is in short supply of both. It is therefore unsurprising that Russia appears desirous to prosecute the war on much reduced terms, terms which appear to be heavily influenced, if not dictated, by the Russian army. In other words, the Russian army is no longer willing to be the obedient unthinking instrument of the Kremlin.
Let’s hope that Ukraine is able to exploit this state of affairs and achieve a cease-fire.
It is quite possible that the best that will be achieved is a neutral Ukraine behind a Line of Control similar to the one separating India and Pakistan. For the time being, it seems likely that the price of a cease-fire will include the loss by Ukraine of some primarily russophonic areas.
In the meantime, Russia will continue to do the only thing that it has been successful at: to use its outsized artillery to destroy Ukrainian cities and kill and injure their citizenry.
Sources used for this piece include:
i) Putin spokesman refuses to rule out use of nuclear weapons if Russia faced an ‘existential threat’ (CNN, March 22, 2022)
ii) Russia targets east Ukraine, says first phase over (BBC News, March 26, 2022)
iii) Russia says it will reduce military operations around Kyiv following talks with Ukraine (CNN, March 29, 2022)
iv) Britain says Russian units forced to return to Belarus, Russia to resupply (Reuters, March 30, 2022)