Ukraine has a decreasing population of around 44 million, a low GDP per capita by Western standards (about 3,000 US$)¹, a relatively large landmass (slightly more than 600,000 km²), an agricultural sector of great interest to China, North Africa and the Middle East, and a long and often very wide river (the Dnieper River) that cuts the country into two roughly equal parts. Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, straddles one of Dnieper’s narrowest points.

Russia, Ukraine’s northern and eastern neighbour — and most recent ruler — has a decreasing population of about 145 million, an economy roughly the size of Canada’s, the world’s largest landmass (17.13 million km²), outsized energy and mineral resources, and a growing irrelevance on the world stage despite its large and modernizing military. Russia has been replaced by China as one of the two global leaders and, except for a few hot spots where Russian mercenaries are active (e.g., Syria, Venezuela and the Central African Republic), is not a global player.

In light of the weakened state of both Ukraine and Russia, the primary reason that the Ukraine-Russia dispute has the attention of the world is that the conflict could destabilize Western Europe and set a poor precedent for other regions of the globe (e.g., Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula).

What does Russia want with Ukraine? Russia does not want Ukraine to become part of NATO or the EU and it wants the West to agree. Russia wants Ukraine to be part of a cordon sanitaire along its borders. Russia at this time would probably be satisfied with regime change in Kyiv and expansion of its eastern Ukrainian territories, perhaps all the way to the Dnieper River. Anything more is unlikely to be attainable with the 130,000 or so Russian troops massed on its border with Ukraine.

If Russia attacks, it would seek a quick resolution. Ukraine is vast and populous: a lengthy invasion and occupation would tax Russia’s military well beyond its financial and political means. These means will quickly shrink once one takes into account the impact of Western sanctions and the displeasure of China, among others, at the destabilization of the world economy (China’s economy is slowing) and food price inflation (as Ukraine is a major food exporter) caused by Russian adventurism.

Can the West accommodate Russia? A practitioner of Cold War Real Politik would have accepted a long time ago that Russia, as a military power, has certain prerogatives, and would never have allowed Ukraine to even entertain the notion of joining the EU or NATO. But that is not the world we live in. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the West has been encouraging the spread of democracy and the assertion of sovereignty throughout much of the world. Unfortunately the results have been uneven and the last ten years in particular have seen the reemergence of autocrats and military regimes in too many countries. 

So what can the West do? It will have to pursue a two-pronged course of action. Firstly, the West must protect its Eastern NATO flank and provide defensive weapons to the Ukrainians so as to raise the cost to Russia of military action. Secondly, the West must recognize Russia’s security concerns along its borders, even if the result is the “Finlandization” of Ukraine. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the West plays a powerful long game when it comes to its basic values. With diplomacy — and patience — there is no reason why Ukraine’s aspirations cannot be achieved over the long term, all the while avoiding armed conflict at this time and its accompanying misery for civilian populations.

¹ Sources for the data referenced here include the World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview#1